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A high-income world egalitarian scenario in the middle of 
the next century is sketched and the conditions for its 
achievement discussed. The question is first raised 
whether it would in fact meet the need for creative work 
or even seem materially satisfying. So far, technical 
progress has been associated with increased tensions: 
these could interfere with the growth of output. Another 
problem is energy. On moderate population projections, 
the achievement of US or even West European levels of 
per capita energy consumption by the whole world would 
i nip J y the exhaustion of fossil fuels within a few decades, 
and the construction of very considerable nuclear capacity. 
Another condition for achieving ’modern * living standards 
on a world wide basis would be the mobilisation of vast 
amounts of capital. It is difficult to see how this can 
transferred to countries requiring a 30 or 40 fold 
1'*crease in per capita income, or what political forces 
v*1 11 produce heavy internal redistribution. The prospect 
,or the 21st century is therefore one of inequality and 
{''•■'orty. But if worldwide modernisation is not feasible, 
policies of opening the door to foreign influences 
1‘come questionable.
ALTERNAI , .
h SCENARIOS FOR 'DEVELOPING' COUNTRIES
THE FUN|i Vj ±NTAL ISSUES
Since 1
integral, /' /oping' countries are now, in varying degrees, 
discuss |, into the world political economy, I cannot 
(Kissibh; i ir scenarios without first referring to the 
do this || dure of the world as a whole. Naturally, to 
input; I,, xroughly would require a very heavy research 
i,( the vv, /er, the main determinants of the structure 
internal 1 M  economy can be broadly discussed, and the 
help of | ( 'die of some scenarios investigated, with the 
'snt research.
A The w> 11
Context
One p o s s , (
(-.ay) 1|,^ M, long-term world scenario is as follows. By 
l*)ljtic.,| 'Mddle of the next century, economic and 
gap (in | 1 Ifferences will have largely disappeared. The
and ’dev , capita income) between today1s 'developing'
!<•<! by i |h .[,e d i countries will have largely been elimina- 
populat i, former's faster economic growth. The size of
• *.\hle 1 |n all continents will be in approximately
contuij 1 librium, with an expectation of life of about 
'• irt di.it! made possible by the control of cancer and 
uncoip ''>e , but very low birth rates. Migration will 
volour | |111 led and considerable. Differences in skin
• «'ntrat i, j I be disappearing with inter-marriage. Con- 
of income will be greatly reduced.u SAr,l,)<>ritv t ‘ M  will in fact be homogenised. The great 
( il live in modern flats in architecturally 
•• '’’f °it, 1 les. Virtually every family will own at 
Mi, ’ and a battery of electric devices that 
f | ’ V 1 , v 'automate1 housework and provide ready 
wk/jV 1 I | '"munication (with friends, shops, banks, etc).
. Mi H available for everyone seeking work; women
(t '"h same types of work as men and wear the same 
1 ’‘M '^most everyone will be able to converse 
* n / p 1' ,* although local dialects will be preserved,
a r, w 1 * ' ' 'rm» like local music and dancing, part of
*.> i,j)*V will the residual religious ceremonies
  M ''9 birth and death. Violence between
will be controlled by behaviourist therapy,
7 'Mi . ,,_ vh , 'ished in "Problems of Cultural Relations in 
ndent World" (East-West Centre, Honolulu,
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, ,, twoen governments by compulsory arbitration. The 
* \,,l Nations will have become virtually a world govern- 
Civil liberties will everywhere be respected, and 
*"✓!«' w jii be a high level of popular participation in
, . 11 u > •
^
f'i
-)
A
“ ♦tr is a basic political difference between Left and 
i‘>l on the route forward: whether this scenario will 
* u'H’nt the logical triumph of the market system, or 
*' ' ih from its crisis and collapse in world revolution.
of course also come about through countries 
L, i nrj along various paths that eventually converge).
"o t he? economic and social objectives there is reason- 
' **')rooment. Even apparent differences on the 
‘ > %a t ional form of this scenario - whether the typical 
• production will be socialist or capitalist - 
’'!,,rcfore how strong will be the eonomic controls
» next 200 years" by Kahn, Brown and Mastell (1976): 
l<>1 views, "Mankind and the Year 2000" by Kosolapov
• *nr! "The Future of Society" by Modrzh: nskaya and
/an (1973). A characteristic of Kahn's work is 
accepts a high degree of inequality as neither 
nor politically implausible.
h y p e r -m o d e rn  scenario is widely deemed both desir- 
. arid inevitable, even among those with very different 
i Meal philosophies. Commissar and capitalist alike 
from the Hebraic roots of Western Civilisation a 
f )Uf,rl Utopianism and from its Hellenic origins a
in the ultimate triumph of scientific method. They 
rt«*fore share a belief that there can and will be a 
«>iwt ion some day to the world's social p r o b l e m s .  2 
*,*h>ut such perspectives, their careers would lack a
meaning, and any ruthlessness involved in exercis- 
j :x>wrr would lose moral justification). All who share
* ..!«• sort of scenario of this kind as a guide to action 
» m  fact more in common than is generally realised.
a . f =,t , they all define the problem to be solved as
ially economic. Second, they all treat economic 
l(\!u.vtors, especially the national income, as a measure 
f progress to a solution. Thirdly, they all see the 
... if.nm t c task as essentially one of 'modernisation', the 
t  which is industrialisation, with the modern sector 
i.rc.wling until it eventually covers 'backward' areas as 
\ , .vth overcomes the primitive cultures to be found 
« . Fourthly, they all assume (and it is merely an
* * »u.*npt j on) that, after some economic level is univer- 
**ily Achieved, social problems will disappear (even,in 
y terms, that the state will wither away).
t<d by governments (world and national), are not as 
they seem: the question is whether big public or
MV.ite bureaucracies will triumph.
certainly evidence that, in many respects, we are 
> in the general direction of this scenario. Economi- 
politically and culturally, an international system 
'•f';ing - incompletely and fitfully, but definitely 
i shape. Moreover, the causes are fairly obvious.
#ital and expertise requirements of high-technology 
, notably aircraft, require output in each industry 
* o n c e n t r a t e d  increasingly in a few models produced 
g,w transnational firms, eliminating small and medium 
'<»rs and their brands. International agencies are 
,.reading rapidly and, like the transnational corpora- 
i they require denationalised staff.
I ) argue that this Utopia, is nevertheless unattain- 
*'u1 that policies based on its feasibility are 
"»usly mistaken. But first let me declare my own 
•ices. Of course, any sane person must welcome some 
of the Utopia especially a secure peace. Of 
, it would be an immense social gain if basic 
• a I needs were met. But taken as a whole, a scenario 
•s type arouses in me feelings of horror and revulsion 
*»ay be reflected in my professional criticism.3 
‘ of course a subjective judgement, and therefore 
•ritific'. But there is no objective way of choosing 
*Jteria for evaluating long-term scenarios, because 
1’* really involved is the meaning of human existence.
‘•ntally one’s choice of criteria is intuitive, and 
*' private set of values ('objective function') gives 
weight to human differences - in nation, race,
"><*» sex, ability, etc. - and to creative work and 
'"‘•ity. Although personality cannot develop unless 
’■ basic material needs are met, these are obviously 
vr* of our requirements, and if their satisfaction 
sacrificing the roots of personal identity, or 
■ring and repetitive work, either on assembly 
in bureaucracies, these are heavy costs to weigh 
•he benefits.
miliar with some of the literature in this field 
'1(o th£\t there is strong correlation between what 
7"pl~’c-- anc  ^what they want to happen: even those who 
“vt doom is nigh seem to enjoy doing so.
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rving out suc^ an intuitive cost/benefit appraisal, 
,uld bear in mind that these needs can be exaggera- 
,or the great majority of mankind, the basic 
* " jcaI needs (for food, water and shelter) have already 
,*t : many of the further needs we see as important 
luding more food and many housing amenities) have been 
itily induced - by emulation and advertising, in fact 
#»•,* very process of modernisation itself. These are 
not needs: indeed, some of them are damaging
«. itain foods, cigarettes, high-speed cars, etc.).
««m i.'l progress can, therefore, never satisfy even 
. trrial demands because it creates new ones all the
. , is no way of verifying the previous paragraphs.
who object to them, as contrary to their own Marxist 
liberal ideologies, or to their introspective assess- 
? of how deprived they would feel (and why) if their 
« rnt income were halved, can only refer to a different 
•witive belief, which underlies these ideologies,
•tentially that human beings are perfectible if consump- 
n wants are satisfied.
«♦ lo say that these are non-verifiable propositions is
• to deny the possibility of finding material that
« >w*» light on them. If material progress is a suf- 
i*i.t condition for solving social problems, we may 
•* tor a decline in neuroses as levels of living rise,
I therefore in such symptoms as violence, mental illness, 
.ifldo and addiction to drugs (whether in a more-or-less
state, like tobacco and cannabis, or fermented into
* * and spirits, or manufactured into sedatives).
• ‘i * 1 1 y, it is of course common knowledge that, on the 
'diary, there are upward trends in these symptoms in
’h ihc capitalist and socialist societies. There is 
fiainly evidence of violence on a worldwide scale in 
* > ’0s, not excluding countries where material pros- 
a;»fy is greatest - rioting, looting, assassination,
•*. bombings, kidnapping, hijackings, etc. While 
! arc various explanations of why these have become
* '»nspj cuousj they must be broadly the products of
Ul1' in modern ‘ society related directly or indirectly 
’ • hnological advance. This suggests that the price
• } for material progress is high.
*V» however, not merely seem biassed, but be profes- 
(•' 1 y ineffective, to base a critique of modernisation 
onal doubts about its widely accepted desirability, 
i uns the risk of being dismissed as another 'back to 
‘ ' crank. So I shall concentrate on whether this 
1 ° is internally consistent - whether a homo- 
*u» Utopia is in fact possible.
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.fitical c o n d i t i o n s
’ *r, ---
tion arises immediately out of what has been said 
’ ''""ro the social stresses of high technology not 
**itfi A trinsically undesirable but also capable of under- 
' the levels of production it makes possible and 
* m vnpower to be diverted into security services ?
*’* 1 Ve* argued that mental illness, suicide and drug 
*? (,n have minimal effects on output. But violence 
jy could become a threat to the functioning of 
' society. So could strikes, the frequency and
, «• of which may be aggravated by the nature of work 
*\mv modern factories apart from the desire to obtain 
\t*»r share in the affluence that seems readily avail-
4 * *‘ ; i «
,v«*r, the modern economy is so inter-dependent as to be 
;v vulnerable to its social stresses^ as input-output 
reveal: holdups even in the manufacture of ball 
say, let alone in electric power supplies, can 
production in a large sector of industry. The social 
, f(, js also vulnerable. Socio-economic unrest can pro- 
authoritarianism, as can be seen throughout the ’Third 
♦, t*. This inhibits innovations and their communication,
, * »h«*?.<* are necessary to scientific advance and therefore 
to the creation of the life styles the scenario
* r n ,
• u p  internal a nd'international peace in the end 
•'ivlttiblo ? Is there not a possibility at least that
ritarian regimes (which take power with the slogan 
•«* *>r<!»'r must be restored) will take advantage of the 
1 * *'f public scrutiny of their policies to threaten the 
f the military products of modern technology, raising
* 'vgor of a pre-emptive strike, especially if their
Arc precarious. One could certainly find material 
•>rt this view - as one example, the Arab-Israeli 
,u h  A major war, or even a series of localised con-
♦ could play havoc with the whole scenario.
y i also inconsistencies (or as Marxists say ’internal
* •rtions’) in this scenario which are more specifi- 
' ■ *nomic and therefore professionally more respect-
1 worldwide spread of modern technology would 
iounts of energy, capital, etc., which can,
’ V roughly and partially, be quantified. These 
would arise first out of the increasing popu- 
’pocxally in ’developing’countries, second from a 
’•'nimpt ion.
many projections of world population, depending 
a s s u m p t i o n s  about fertility. Here I shall o nl y 
V *  ; vl/t S which have be en  thoroughly worked out; 
f the United Nations4 and Mesarovic and Pestel5:-
Table 1
World Population Projections, 
2000 and 2050 (billions)
1975 2000 2050
. t N> t ions - Medium variant 
- Low variant
4.0
4.0
6.3
5.8
* .vle-Pestel - High variant 
- Low variant
6.7
5.2
11.2
6.3
. estimates were all prepared in 1973, and assume moderate
• in mortality. I have omitted two higher UN variants,
! #.n constant and gradually declining fertility respec-
. » • •cause since 1973 it has become clear that fertility
»*!tng.6 The UN projections quoted are based on assump- 
•f moderate and fast fertility declines (outside 
■im Iurope where it is assumed to stabilise). Inter­
ne values of 6 billion (2000) and 9 billion (2050) will
• b>r the purposes of the rough estimates in this paper, 
,»*•') a growth of 50% in the last quarter of this century
• ’th**r 50% in the first half of the next, with a con-
< ’ deceleration. Some such slowing down would be
*Afv to make the scenario realisable.
'bt Population Prospects, 1970-2000" (ESA/p/WP.53.1975)
,it the Turning Point - The Second Report to the 
t V >me" (1974).
'’kilty Trends, 1950-1975" by W.Parker Mauldin in 
n Uouncil Annual Report (1975).
o a c t i o n s  for population can be combined with two 
a b o u t  energy consumption. 7 The implication of 
' \ i" iii a Ford Foundation study is that, by the year
“  o US consumption of energy would rise from its 1970 
* I of 1° t o n n e s  of coal equivalent (tee) per capita to 
he*"assumption that relative energy prices returned 
’ early 1 9 7 0 s  level. 8 This would correspond to upper-
-class US consumption levels today. If we take this 
\|,e world average in the mid-21st century, as is more 
*4 §ss jpjpiicit in the Utopian scenario - let us call this 
,M*rio A - and the population projection suggested above,
' <■ very heavy energy consumption indeed, as Table II
Table If
The implications of different hypotheses 
or, world energy consumption for 2050
World Total in Approx 1974-2050 
As.-umed average 2050 (billions cumulative^
(tee per capita) of tee) (billions of tee)
• cnario A
28 (US, 2000) 252 10,000
VrnArio B
6 (Sweden, 1974) 54 2,000
* r area under a logarithmic curve assuming a constant 
*'«’ of growth.
<an be compared first with the actual world consumption 
l«*ss than 9 billions tee in 1975 (2.25 tee per capita) , 
'‘*cond with proven reserves of fossil fuels (coal, oil 
1 natural gas) at about 1,500 billions tee, mostly coal.
♦ I• wo drawn the basic material on energy consumption 
a chapter by John Chesshire and Keith Pavitt in 
U! futures: The Great Debate” ed Chris Freeman and 
Tupod,t (Science Policy Research Unit, Sussex, to be 
 ^ ‘i-.hed by Martin Robertson in 1978).
■wio to Choose" ed David Freeman (Ballinger, 1974).
■i
b
i y t
• V I  *
( i l »
. i
* ♦v f e d
4 V
£
. t *  tQ\
— i
r «• k * ’ |
? 0  *1 1 *1  1
I •• >u \
, i« * ,
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i I ow for hydro-electric power and for ultimately 
fossil fuels being several times as great as 
.roven reserves. There are of course also other 
Mional sources of energy which have hardly been 
»L1 (geothermal, solar, wind, tidal). These 
•wever, technical uncertainties (especially in 
rage) and timelags and capital costs, as does the 
t of reserves yet unproven. So this hypothesis 
restricting fossil fuels (even in countries 
are abundant) to prime uses, especially vehicles 
ry efficient and light-weight storage batteries 
ped) .
Iso mean the development of very great nuclear 
1 • in particular breeder reactors. The greater
' (<is capacity would have to be constructed in 
<, which would be very short of fossil fuel re- 
the consumption levels postulated. The capital 
hroducing enough money to raise the whole of Asia 
fy), Africa and Latin America to this level would 
so would the environmental problems. These 
uild be consuming more than three-quarters of
I *s total energy. Moreover, fossil fuels would 
honsive as they became more difficult to extract,
•duction declined in an increasing number of 
’•rs, aggravating their need for revenue. This 
I• to stimulate production of new sources of energy, 
"r countries with limited reserves of fossil fuels 
*v energy or install massive nuclear capacity, it 
'*»e them even more severe financial problems than 
I price rises, making it very hard indeed for them 
up economically.
ncy of ’modernisers' faced with such arguments is, 
ally, to fall back on miracles - in this case a 
’at ways will be found to develop unconventional 
‘•nergy in time and cheaply. And that some system
II scovered for monitoring the output of plutonium 
»>lling its uses, involving even more remarkable
’atjve and political assumptions. Much the same 
answer are offered to those who point to the 
nuclear 'incidents’ and the certainity of highly 
effluents difficult to store.
* it is very doubtful whether such immense nuclear 
would be consistent with the libertarian aspects 
‘*nario, in view of the serious security problems 
n-;clear power stations, and whether this capacity 
'‘•stricted to peaceful uses.
j to aVoid the conclusion that scenario A has to be
*',u i us turn to an alternative scenario (B), in
,('<W ' consumption standards and patterns are, f\(i r t* in o u = .uch as arG currGn  ^ ln Sweden, where energy con-
! ■'1 ’ j . in7 4 ran at 6 tee per capita. Yet this would» *«in i n \ ------ ----too big a growth °f energy consumption to be
* *<! bv iossil fuels, or even non-conventional sources.
reach the level projected for 2050 in Table IE 
7 * •fiuirc supplies of at least 20 billion tee in the 
•, hh) or more than double the level of 1974. It is 
I }ik*'ly that energy from fossil fuels could double in 
'«• r iod or great progress be made with new sources.
;t,n' nuclear power would have to make a contribution 
oider of 5 bill ion tee, and rising rapidly, involv- 
teasing reliance on fast breeders in the 21st cen- 
though not nearly as much as in scenario A. It is 
drawing attention to the fact that heavy reliance on 
\r power seems very probable in Sweden itself in the 
future, and it will be inevitable when oil becomes 
*♦»
Me i eductions in energy consumption are, however, 
ltd by scenario B for the USA where per capita consump- 
already more than twice the figure mentioned above, 
Pother increases would need to be prevented throughout 
developed1 world. On paper, the growth of energy use 
* halted by various means. Improved energy conver- 
techniques could make some contribution. But incomes 
irdustrial production could only continue to rise in 
•A and other developed countries - with average energy 
•**pt ion being held to this level - if there were sub- 
M a i  changes in patterns of consumption, especially
* ions in the use of energy in private motoring, cen- 
hoating, electrical gadgets, etc.
these changes be brought about? Of course,
»n energy prices are virtually implicit and would 
?o ( hange consumption patterns in the right direction, 
v would hardly be compatible with an egalitarian 
•'> as lias been pointed out above. So either a halt to 
growth or strict consumption controls (or taxes) 
•■‘•odod. Yet there seems, even embryonical ly,
Elation of forces in international or national 
P 'wertui enough to compel the publics of 'deve- 
"irUries to accept an end to economic growth or
' 1 OPEC countries, notably Kuwait and Venezuela, 
y  I'vs already passed its peak and is likely to 
by 2000. To double coal output would 
‘ heavy investments.
. . their life styles to this degree. On the
c o m p a n i e s  and unions in sectors producing energy,
*»l!y electricity, and equipment for energy production,
* Mng energy (especially motor cars), would be
1 adversaries. In the absence of a feasible politi-
h.uusm, why should even this, much less ambitious 
m »o be taken seriously ?
•,-it i.Ally threatening problem would be raised by car- 
».,,xlde emission. II A cumulative energy use of 2,000 
„ tee (largely of fossil fuels) over the next 75 
*,» would cause a total emission of over 2,000 billion 
.,j n( carbon dioxide. Even if half of that were
•«m|, mainly by the sea, as is believed to be happening 
(and there is some question mark over the absorp- 
, capacity of the oceans), there would be a significant 
•ton to the amount currently in the atmosphere, about 
«. billion tonnes. Each 1,000 billion tonnes may raise
i.vgc temperature of the earth by more than loc.
. v*»r, we need to allow for the dust particles, some of
• originate in the burning of fossil fuels, also 
filing surface heat radiation. However, it is by no
• <«’rtain that this warming effect would be unwelcome, 
txperts argue that this 'carbon dioxide g r e e n h o u s e '12
* .f industrialisation has recently been offset, at
to 1970, and even outweighed by basic cooling 
'fancies, also partly man-made (due to deforestation etc.)
; ’< n ending economic growth would mean changing life
because of the employment problem. Growing produc- 
rould only be offset by increased leisure and shifts 
> 'if . intensive forms of production, if unemployment 
' 1 • b<> avoided.
1 v* heavily here on a draft chapter for a study to be
• «’d by the INTERFUTURES group of OECD.
i c changes in the coming decade" by George Kukla 
-•J-iVht to r the Future Vol 11 No 1 (UNITAR, 1977). 
i ho following issue in which Irving Kaplan makes 
! «’Xirome) suggestion that there is a basic cooling 
v a decade and forecasting a climatic crisis in
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nrl is apparently unpredictable in the present
' 4 \f k n o w l e d g e ,  but whichever way it went its effects
*** ' c o u l d  be very s e r i o u s .  13 (Another argument
gCOnario A is that it might well have devastating
> n..t "especially on the polar ice caps).*
,-jj_t.il needs
, vje of capital has already been mentioned as an 
«.,V>ment to solving the energy shortage. However, even 
m* n o  B would require very big capital investments in 
• M ,ctors. Of course, capital is only one requirement 
growth (less important than technical progress) but it 
* ^M»n t ia 1.
- ,.r capita income of Sweden was $ 7,200 in 1974. If 
poorest countries are to achieve anything like this 
-,«• level, say $5,000 (at 1974 prices), the great bulk 
t * >rbl investment would have to be devoted to Africa,
« ,.\ and parts of Latin America - the opposite to its 
trrnt distribution.
. }*' were 33 countries in 1974 with a population of 1,130 
; ; ions where income was less than $200 per capita 
. *’ ugh one must take these figures as very tentative 
*«;•.«» incomes in poor rural areas are very inadequately 
»»•<!). Their average income was $130. To raise that 
r ,oo0 would mean a nearly 40-fold increase: if it is
* *■«' done by 2050, that would require a growth of 5%
» «-u. These countries, which include India, Indonesia,
and Bangladesh, are among those where population 
**»• at a relatively fast pace, and might well treble 
'**«♦ next three-quarters of a century 14 (this would need 
’hart 2% a year) so that total GNP would have to rise 
’hart 100-fold or say by $20,000 billions. Using a 
v arbitrary incremental capital output ratio of 3 
> low in view of the capital needs of energy above), 
«>uld require some $60,000 billions of capital 
-'f'wnt altogether, starting with an annual rate of 
• J b i l l i o n s  in the 1970s, and then growing rapidly,
, 1 •' would in any case be something disquieting
Wing on a canopy provided by burning fossil fuels 
a descent, possibly a swift one, into another ice
1 i no with a trend intermediate between the 
'•*d 'low1 projections for South Asia, but one 
'ihor sceptical about the implied density of 
ihere are already signs that mortality is 
all in this region.
■vlcnt to 20% of GNP. This is quite beyond the sav- 
° -apaci ties of the countries concerned, especially 
4 their incomes are to become less concentrated, and 
is to be more participation in government. The 
Mjtal requirements of scenario A would of course be 
V n greater. Since the energy constraint (at least for 
'1st century) is ultimately a capital constraint, 
all that one need to say to demonstrate that a 
' j.irni living standard for the masses of South Asia or 
.,*ral other regions cannot be financed out of their own 
,sources within the foreseeable future.
s .per possibility is an increase in foreign aid. This 
»i*i have to be massive and on very easy terms, but one
back to the question: where is the necessary political 
;)Me to come from ? Humanitarian motives in rich coun-
• ( j»• s are not to be despised, but in fact they have carried 
jit tic political muscle so far. Moreover, as energy
plies become more expensive, the long-term economic
♦ frods of many rich countries which import oil will in- 
. .<!<• chronic inflation and recurring foreign exchange
vficits: these will induce deflationary policies, 
farther weakening their aid lobbies.
rif.cei vably, concerted action by the governments of ' deve- 
mrj* countries, using their bargaining weapons collec- 
* I y, could shift capital towards them via commodity 
*>.p|*>rt and other devices. Indeed, this is what has been 
•«’ty roughly sketched in the 'New International Economic 
« W ' .  However, there is little reason to expect from 
**nt diplomatic history that such a coalition would sur- 
the detailed and strenuous bargaining need to bring 
*‘out such a redistribution of the world's wealth.
1 'iMu'r possibility which somehow sustains the optimism 
">«' is that a united international prelotariat wilJL_
“ «throw world capitalism at its centre. It is now very 
’ i enable whether this old dream is in any way 
; *' H  c. Real wages in 'developing' countries can 
* ■ *1V he in creased greatly without depriving 'developed'
’ rj»»s of the means to buy enough energy and other 
‘ resources to maintain the real incomes of their 
* -King classes. Even were a revolutionary govern- 
t \ko over a core-capitalist country, it could 
''fiord to let real incomes, especially of indus- 
Vsorkcrs, decline substantially. What the oil crisis 
raw material shortages in recent years have 
,r> expose the lack of fundamental common interests, 
s,) ]n any case been undermined by the widening of 
•vTi<>nal wage differences in the past century, and to
■ e  nationalism.
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r,thcr const.raints
possible constraint would be educational. To 
A,in . the technical level of the population, especially 
r#U^frica, to today's West European levels within 75 
'[ -s would be an immense task, especially in tropical 
Vf' ca. 1^ would imply achieving virtually universal 
* iucation up to age 16, and numerous big institutions 
’Y'higher education. This would not in itself be imposs­
ible. It would, however, increase the financial strain 
Vn the poorest countries, especially in view of the 
\\rne and increasing fraction of their population in the 
'Ihool age groups. It would also require the retention 
’bin the educational system of a big fraction of the 
1put of its higher level to teach the swelling num- 
»,'rs: this would make it more difficult to find the 
..dificd manpower for the other sectors.
;; all these problems were solved and all sections of 
ow community had full access to secondary education,
»jjc*ro would be a big question about who would do the 
♦* \' u>\ 1 jobs, especially on the farms, in the mines and 
*h«’ hotels. This gap has been largely filled in Western 
; ,i<>pe and North America by use of migrant labour and by 
mechanisation. But there would, in this scenario, be no 
v mr available (even for the 'developed' countries to 
mjvort) and widespread mechanisation in 'developing' 
•jrjtrj.es would make the capital costs of full employ- 
nt extremely high. A degree of direction of labour 
*-uld seem inevitable, as in the socialist countries to- 
-Uy, hut that would be a major defect in the scenario.
: d is even more fundamentally a distributional prob-
i,1i despite the prospective continued loss of agri- 
•'ural land due to erosion and urbanisation. Total 
#d output could no doubt keep pace with the increase 
" >rld population indicated above - a rise of l a  
f wuuid suffice.15 In many areas, however, food 
option would need to rise much faster than this 
near future, not merely to achieve nutritional 
1’ which are acceptable on humanitarian grounds, but 
,f) satisfy the scenario. One reason is that if 
‘n are born and grow up undernourished in the last 
' 1 of this century, the work force of the next will 
Physically or mentally capable of the output 
needed even on scenario B.
are’ however, great doubts about the possibili- 
! jsh output rising substantially, especially if
1 for the increased hydrocarbon pollution of the 
. , 1 ? h°t:b fallout and tanker spillage) implicit in
'M o * In addition, growing pressures on land 
f 1 (-o meat production. A faster increase in crop 
dd therefore be needed.
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\ fast increase in agricultural production in Africa and 
Via would be implicit in the scenario, not merely to satisfy 
needs, but also to provide employment,especially in 
<1,0 decades before urbanisation there is high. This raises 
Mfoblems of rural organisation, including technological 
'•if fusion and reforming systems of land tenure, and the time 
I wjs involved are great. To increase food consumption to 
vloijuate levels in the poorest areas with the fastest 
i n c r e a s e  in population growth (and the greatest difficulty 
,n affording fertilisers and other inputs) could hardly be 
{,,nc without an acceleration of the current flows of food 
from the main cereal exporters, especially the USA, and 
heavy internal redistribution of income. Questions are 
via in raised about the political feasibility of this, 
whether we look at the international or internal require­
ments, and also about its economic implications, because 
, • is difficult to transfer food without discouraging its 
production by recipients.16
Metals could be another constraint, especially on achiev­
ing world incomes of the levels indicated above, but the 
jjossibility always exists of mining lower-grade or deeper 
u«*s in response to rising prices. This will only slow 
world economic growth if policymakers cannot either control 
»>r tolerate price inflation or find it difficult to raise 
•ho necessary capital.
*i ious types of pollution (pesticides, phosphates, ni- 
• rates etc) would also be very high at these levels of 
output. The problem is one of identifying and then abating 
them. It seems that considerable progress has already been
vie in the former and that the costs of the latter need 
>t be unreasonable.17 The problems are again ones of 
«*>litical motivation, in this case especially in the coun- 
‘r tos that would need to grow fastest.
\ 'i,There would also be resistance on the part of food impor- 
especially Japan and many Western European countries, 
-he terms of trade being turned in favour of food pro- 
‘‘rs, as this scenario implies.
Jhe United Nations World Input-Output Model", W.
* <nt i e f  ( 1976 )
sum up the argument so far, it is ' technically and 
fonomically unfeasible - if only because of the energy 
* rid capital implications - to achieve by the middle of 
j,e next century consumption standards for the mass of 
the world's population at a level corresponding to today's 
higher incomes in the United States, if only because of 
the energy and investment demands. Equality at less energy- 
tntensive levels, such as those of Sweden today, would 
possibly be technically and economically feasible but 
!>. ,1 i tically highly doubtful, because it would mean putting 
\ ceiling on incomes and/or drastically changing consump­
tion habits in the 'developed' countries.
In fact, the only reasonable expectation is that there will 
*,ti 11 be large international inequalities in the middle of 
the 21st century, although around an income level much 
higher than today. Some people will, as today, enjoy 
'modern' living standards:some will not. Whether any 
individual does so will depend, also as today, partly on 
what bargaining strength his or her government possesses 
or can develop. Indeed, in the harsh world of natural 
resource shortages, bargaining capacity will be more import­
ant. Oil exporters will enjoy long-term improvements in 
the terms of trade and fast rates of economic growth - 
as long as their oil revenues persist. But there is little 
prospect of countries without many trump cards to play, 
or considerable technological and political capacity, doing 
much more economically than keeping pace with population 
growth, unless it slows down considerably. Big, poor coun­
tries, like India, Bangladesh, Burma and Egypt, may well 
continue in a state of semi-stagnation. So, while there 
fctll be changes in the ranking of countries, the prospect 
is for the concentration of income between them to continue 
increasing.  J
u National scenarios
'lrr,mo distribution
{ us however also explore the consistency of the internal 
•tensions of the scenario sketched at the beginning. This 
o envisaged greater equality wi thin countries, especially 
A<’loping' countries. In half of these, the poorest 40% 
v,e only 9% of income18 (although the caution about rural
income Inequality" by Montek Ahluwalia in Redistri- 
•-Upn._with Growth (IBRD-IDS, 1974), p 7.
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income measurement must be born in mind), as against 14% 
of income in Sweden. Even if average incomes rise 40-fold, 
as would be necessary in some countries to achieve scenario 
B, let alone A, the incomes of the local rich would have 
to be held back if those with the lowest incomes were to 
attain current Swedish-style levels of living. Yet it is 
precisely those who are already rich who have the technical 
expertise and capital to benefit from growth and there is 
little sign of a decrease in the concentration of income in 
any of the fast-growing economies where this can be 
measured.
What would be needed to achieve such massive internal 
redistributions of income would be drastic changes in the 
ownership of property, particularly land. The scenario 
would be incompatible with anything like the present con­
centration of land ownership, if only because large farms 
are normally producing at low levels of output per hectare, 
mostly livestock products, so the necessary rise in 
cereal output could not be obtained; yet landowners con­
stitute one of the main bases of political power for exist­
ing regimes. The scenario would also imply taking away 
many of the economic and political privileges of state 
bureaucracies. To identify plausible internal forces to 
bring about the situation described in either scenario 
is almost as difficult as to discern what would achieve 
it on the international plane.19
Those living the ’modern' life have every incentive not to 
give up their privileges, even if it means (as it often 
does) using political repression to preserve them: indeed 
the increasing price of oil has already reinforced their 
determination not to sacrifice energy-intensive life 
styles. Such consumption tastes are shaped by external 
cultural examples, in contrast of course to those of 
their counterparts in the industrialising countries of 
Europe in the 19th century. They also receive political 
support from abroad (which inhibits their exercising what 
bargaining power they have in international negotiations). 
Moreover,world scenario B requires them not only to accept 
such economic sacrifices but simultaneously to implement 
complex socio-economic plans that would need great effort 
and judgement. Yet it has been argued that scenario B is 
politically unfeasible - in that event, all the capital 
and educational costs of ending massive rural and urban 
poverty would require even greater internal redistribution.
One consequence is that a fast decline in population 
growth and its levelling off seems improbable. Population
’Not quite, because those who are most deprived can get 
within stone-throwing distance of the national elite.
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'must ultimately be an endogenous variable in scenarios, 
and though the causal mechanism is complex and not clearly 
established, it clearly depends in large part and general 
on socio-economic progress.
The original vision of ’dualism’ theorists was that the 
modern sector would spread gradually until it enveloped 
the whole population - as had apparently happened in the 
•developed’ countries. This is obviously very improbable.
External Links
Here we have come to a crucial point in the argument.
Suppose the contrary were true and ’modernisation’ could 
be relied on sooner or later to eliminate poverty, and 
create internal scenarios with high and fairly well-dis­
persed incomes. Then it would be argued that the optimal 
strategy in most ’developing’ countries would be to open 
the doors to the inflow of foreign capital and technology 
and the associated political and cultural influences, 
because the price in terms of the partial destruction of 
national culture would, on humanitarian grounds, be worth 
paying and perhaps be politically inevitable. It would 
be correct to consider, as ’modernisers’ do, local langu­
ages, religions, traditional customs, etc. as ’obstacles’ 
which would (no doubt regrettably) need to be removed.
But it is clearly not worth paying that price unless there 
is a good prospect that this sort of scenario can in fact 
be realised., A more plausible world scenario is indicated 
by this analysis - and in my personal view also more _ ^
desirable. It envisages strong and more independent 
nations (not necessarily with the same frontiers as today) 1 
restricting foreign political and cultural influences, 
and therefore limiting economic contacts. Consumption 
would be physiologically adequate but its pattern would 
not be a copy of those in the ’developed’ countries, 
development plans would build on local traditions, which 
would be seen as the essential conditions of achieving 
die scenario not as ’obstacles’.
!his does not by any means necessarily mean autarchy, i.e. 
cutting off foreign influences completely. For countries 
that are already integrated into the world economy,
■'Pecially small ones, this option is not really open, 
many, industries rely heavily on inputs from abroad 
°*g. tractors, mining machinery, steel, heavy chemicals).
maments, food and enerqy often have to be imported.
■' hnological progress may be largely obtained through 
transnational corporations. To sever external links 
'h the major powers would mean painful social costs in 
r‘,L‘ 1 orm of increased unemployment and lower real incomes 
targe sections of the population, especially those in 
! rt industries, the bureaucracy and sections of the 
f'5sions and industrial working classes. In such 
‘‘tries, the political basis for a ’closed door’ policy 
1 hei.efore narrow. On the other hand, those opposing
such a policy get powerful foreign support, including on 
occasion military intervention.20
One should not draw the conclusion, on the other hand that 
a more egalitarian and self-sufficient scenario must 
necessarily prove unworkable. Great political change can 
be expected in many countries because of growing income 
inequality and the continuation of severe poverty. What 
it does mean is that to succeed, a revolutionary strategy 
would need to allow scope for foreign links for some de­
cades at least. This appears to be true even of China, to 
judge from the defeat of the xenophobic and highly egali­
tarian ’gang of four’. It is true a fortiori of smaller 
countries which are much less able to insulate themselves 
politically, culturally or economically.21.
The clue to the survival of any type of government is a 
selective policy towards foreign influences, judging each 
proposition (e.g. an investment project) on the basis of an 
objective appraisal of its social costs and benefits. This 
applies to ’developed' countries as well as the ’developing' 
(and the previous sharp contrast is becoming obsolete). 
Selectivity has been and still is the Japanese practice.
It is now implied by the very elastic term 'self-reliance'.
It means training cadres capable of deciding what foreign 
inputs are necessary for national development; how high a
price should be paid for them (in cultural and political
as well as economic terms); and which country is the best 
source, taking account of the need for a technology appro­
priate to national circumstances - and of the intrinsic 
advantage of diversification. It also means avoiding 
being politically dependent on any single great power.
20. All this was demonstrated by the failure of the insur­
rection in Sri Lanka in 1971, which was based precisely 
on a policy of achieving autarchyby converting the tea 
estates to food production. Support from Colombo workers, 
which the JVP hoped for, never materialised.
21. It might be argued that the Cuban Revolution has sur­
vived despite the severance of nearly all links with the 
United States. However, this was largely due to the 
Soviet government stepping in to replace the United States 
and to offer not merely a guaranteed market for the lead­
ing export (sugar) but also credits for arms and for the 
inputs essential to keep the economy running. They could 
hardly provide help on this scale to many countries (even 
if their basic foreign policy in the years ahead permitted 
them to sponsor additional revolutions of the Cuban type).
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Such a basically nationalist strategy also requires a 
'sufficient cultural basis and a knowledgeable political 
leadership.
Kininnal Structures
Here we come into a field where the crystal ball is even 
more cloudy, and generalisation very difficult. However, 
i t seems that the scenario just sketched may require the 
elimination of caste and other social differences, and a 
moderation of income inequality, to achieve the 
' necessary national unity (especially since egalitarian 
ideas cannot be completely kept out, in the late 20th 
century). Moreover, import-intensive consumption pat­
terns cannot easily be changed without reducing the con­
centration of income. However, policies to achieve this 
would come up against the same vested interests as would 
obstruct egalitarian tendencies in the 'modernising1 
scenario. In fact, a scenario of this type might well 
also prove unattainable in countries with deep social 
and/or ethnic divisions. In such countries, the likeli­
hood is a continuation of a vacillating strategy, alter­
nating between different ideologies and different inter­
nal and external sources of support as they each in turn 
prove politically unmanageable. Ghana has been a case 
in point.
Size may also be a constraint. Very small economies can 
hardly develop the necessary bargaining capacity, and 
their specialised economies are likely to be heavily 
dependent on foreign markets as well as foreign sources 
of the essential goods listed above. In economic theory, 
these weaknesses can be reduced by regional integration, 
but so far, none of the regional groupings of small 
countries (in East Africa, the Caribbean, Central America 
or the Andean region, for example) have been very effec­
tive. There may not be, even in these groups of neigh­
bours, efficient cultural and political homogeneity to 
build the political framework for integration.^-
22 Some countries,like Puerto Rico, may be able to reduce 
poverty by becoming part of a big neighbour and enjoying 
' he guaranteed protecion of its fiscal system. There may, 
however, be a heavy price to pay in the weakening of 
r,'G ional culture, for example the perversion of music 
• ukI fiances into entertainment spectacles, and a contamina- 
of the language.
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Some countries may seem to have sufficient assets to be 
able to envisage a future scenario with a high degree of 
self-reliance, e.g. oil exporters. However, most of them 
are heavily dependent on foreign firms for production 
technology and for marketing their oil. Moreover, the 
exchange rates and wage levels made possible by oil 
revenues inhibit the emergence of other sectors, so that 
when oil revenues decline, the economic structure ceases 
to be viable. Despite the prospect of rising oil prices, 
such revenue declines are likely before 2050 for all 
existing exporters, except perhaps Saudi Arabia, because 
of the exhaustion of resources. In the meantime, in the 
smaller ones, national unity is undermined by dependence 
on migrant labour, and great inequality.
It is the larger economy, with oil enough to provide for 
local needs, but not enough to distort the economy (e.g. 
Brazil, Nigeria, Indonesia, or China) which is most likely 
to achieve high incomes, widely dispersed, and a degree 
of self-reliance in the next century, provided social 
and ethnic differences do not disrupt them.
Further than this one can hardly go. The analysis points 
to a patchwork map in the next century, with some countries 
still dependent on the capitalist powers and showing 
income and internal inequalities, alongside perhaps neigh­
bours with more highly controlled economies linked to the 
Soviet Union or China and others (probably bigger) able 
to pursue a partially independent strategy with a big 
emphasis on nationalism. In another dimension, some would 
have very high average incomes by today’s standards, high 
enough to have eliminated mass poverty: in others, the 
combination of slow growth and increasing inequality will 
imply that large-scale poverty persists.
